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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports two attacks on Undercover, a human 
authentication scheme against passive observers proposed at CHI 
2008. The first attack exploits nonuniform human behavior in 
responding to authentication challenges and the second one is 
based on information leaked from authentication challenges or 
responses visible to the attacker. The second attack can be 
generalized to break two alternative Undercover designs presented 
at Pervasive 2009. All the attacks exploit design flaws of the 
Undercover implementations. 
Theoretical and experimental analyses show that both attacks can 
reveal the user’s password with high probability with O(10) 
observed login sessions. Both attacks were verified by using the 
login data collected in a user study with 28 participants. We also 
propose some enhancements to make Undercover secure against 
the attacks reported in this paper.  
Our research in breaking and improving Undercover leads to two 
broader implications. First, it reemphasizes the principle of “devil 
is in details” for the design of security-related human-computer 
interface. Secondly, it reveals a subtle relationship between 
security and usability: human users may behave in an insecure 
way to compromise the security of a system. To design a secure 
human-computer interface, designers should pay special attention 
to possible negative influence of any detail of the interface 
including how human users interact with the system. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Access controls, 
Authentication; H.1.2 [User/Machine Systems]: Human factors. 
General Terms 
Security, Human Factors 
Keywords 
Passwords, Observation Attack, Undercover, Tactile Device, 
Audio Channel, Timing Attack, Intersection Attack 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Any reasonably-sensitive computer system starts from a user 
authentication process where a human user has to prove her 
identity. Contemporary systems use one or a combination of the 
following authentication methods: “what you know” (e.g., 
passwords), “what you have” (e.g., hardware tokens) or “who you 
are” (e.g., biometrics like our fingerprints) [39]. The user 
authentication process plays a key role in the security of the whole 
system since it is the first (and often the only) means to prevent 
unauthorized access by illegitimate users. 
Despite the existence of more advanced user authentication 
methods, the simplest one based on static passwords/PINs has 
been the most widely adopted method since its birth in the 1960s. 
This is because other more advanced methods either require 
additional costs or decrease the usability. A salient drawback of 
static passwords/PINs is that they are extremely sensitive to replay 
attacks: they can be stolen and then simply replayed by attackers 
to impersonate legitimate users. In other words, when a user’s 
identity is protected by a static password/PIN, stealing this 
password/PIN means stealing the user’s identity.  
There are many different ways to steal a user’s static 
password/PIN. One of the simplest ways is shoulder surfing [45], 
which can be automated by installing hidden cameras or fake 
keypads or even fake terminals (like fake ATMs) [3]. Other ways 
of identity theft include social engineering attacks like phishing 
[24] and malware-based attacks like keylogging and Trojan horses 
[6,17]. These attacks are often described as “observation attacks” 
in literature, to highlight the fact that the attacker can observe 
communications between the user and the verifier computer.  
Since the early 1990s many solutions have been proposed to fight 
observation attacks. With the exception of a few specialized 
hardware based solutions, most solutions are challenge-response 
user authentication protocols based on shared secrets. In each 
authentication session, the user is asked to give responses to a 
number of random challenges based on her knowledge of the 
shared secret. Let the shared secret, the challenges, and the 
responses be denoted by S, C and R, respectively. The user will 
be accepted only when R=f(C,S). In an observation attack, we 
assume that the attacker can observe both C and R but does not 
have access to S. The main task of the attacker is to solve S from 
C and R. Accordingly, the task of the user authentication system 
is to design a mapping f such that the attacker cannot (partially or 
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completely) recover S from C and R. Different solutions use 
different mappings and generate random challenges in different 
manner. Unfortunately, some solutions have been found insecure 
against multiple observations and others are not usable in terms of 
the average login time. A solution that is both secure and usable 
remains an open problem. 
While most previous efforts were based on the assumption that 
random challenges C and responses R are fully observable to the 
attacker, some researchers proposed to make C and R completely 
or partially unobservable to increase the complexity of solving S.  
The idea of unobservable challenges was proposed by several 
different groups of researchers independently in 2006 [11,27,36]. 
The unobservable challenge is transmitted via a tactile device that 
can be sensed by the user but not visible to an observer. Later at 
CHI’2008, Sasamoto et al. proposed another design called 
Undercover [43], in which part of the challenges is sent to the user 
via a moving trackball covered by the user’s hand. Hayashi et al. 
claimed that Undercover is secure against multiple observations as 
long as the hidden challenges are truly unobservable to attackers. 
Hasegawa et al. from the same research group proposed two 
alternative designs in [21], one of which uses an audio channel as 
the carrier of the hidden challenges. Some other researchers have 
also been inspired to propose similar solutions [8,9,14,41]. 
In this paper, we report two attacks on the original design of 
Undercover in [43]. One attack can also be generalized to the 
alternative designs in [21]. Our attacks are based on flaws in the 
Undercover design, and one attack exploits human users’ 
nonuniform behavior on how they respond to different hidden 
challenges. To be more precise, an average user tends to respond 
faster to one specific hidden challenge, thus the fastest response 
exposes this hidden challenge with a considerably high 
probability. Both theoretical and experimental analyses show that 
the two attacks can recover the password or part of it with 
considerably high probability with O(10) observed login sessions. 
When less than ten login sessions are observed, the attacker is still 
able to get a reduced password space for launching a random 
guess attack with a better chance or a brute force attack with less 
complexity. The human behavior based attack was validated by a 
user study with a total of 28 users performed at two distinct 
geographical locations.  
We also propose some effective enhancements to make 
Undercover secure against the proposed attacks. Our investigation 
on the enhancements revealed more nonuniformities of human 
behavior in interacting with the user interface, which further 
highlight some unique principles we need to follow for the design 
of secure human-computer interfaces. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First we give a brief 
survey of related work, and then detail different designs of 
Undercover. Afterwards we describe our attacks and demonstrate 
their real performance with experimental results. Then, we 
propose some enhancements and show how the Undercover 
system can be made secure against our attacks. Finally, we discuss 
how the timing attack may be generalized to other human 
authentication systems. Theoretical analyses of the two attacks are 
covered in the Appendix.   
2. RELATED WORK 
In the challenge-response protocol we described above, the key is 
to find a good mapping f so that the computation R=f(C,S) can be 
easily handled by an average human user while at the same time 
maintain the expected security level. If a hardware device is 
available to assist the human user, it is not difficult to choose a 
strong trapdoor one-way function as f, thus leading to a 
cryptographically strong system. Unfortunately, to protect the 
device from unauthorized access, a password/PIN is still needed, 
which is again vulnerable to observation attacks. If the hardware 
device is a general-purpose one like a mobile phone, then mobile 
malware can be another potential threat [17]. 
If auxiliary hardware devices cannot be used, the mapping f has to 
be sufficiently simple for human users to mentally calculate the 
correct responses. While the user has his/her own brain as the only 
computational resource, the attacker can access a supercomputer 
or even a large number of distributed computing resources (e.g., a 
botnet). Furthermore, to make a human authentication system 
usable in reality, the average login time and the error rate should 
be small. In contrast, the attacker can wait for a long time to break 
a victim’s secret. Intuitively argued, it is non-trivial to find a 
mapping f that makes the constructed human authentication 
system both sufficiently secure and highly usable. Since the 
1990s, there have been a number of attempts in this field, but they 
are either insecure or not usable in terms of average login time.  
To the best of our knowledge, the first solution against 
observation attack was proposed by Matsumoto and Imai in 1991 
[38]. The solution tries to hide the user’s secret in the response by 
using a question alphabet and a randomized answer alphabet. 
Unfortunately, a few years later Wang et al. pointed out [46] that 
Matsumoto-Imai scheme is not sufficiently secure if the same 
challenge can be replayed several times by an active adversary. In 
addition, to achieve a high level of security, Matsumoto-Imai 
scheme has to use large question and answer alphabets, thus 
compromising usability [33]. Wang et al. also proposed an 
improved scheme to enhance the security, but the usability is 
much worse.  
Matsumoto later proposed several other solutions based on inner 
products of secret and public vectors [37]. As pointed out in 
[23,33], these solutions cannot resist multiple observations 
because the secret vector can be solved from O(N) observations, 
where N is the size of the secret vector. 
Li and Teng proposed a new solution based on lexical shifting and 
matching in [35]. Although no cryptanalysis has been reported so 
far, its usability is not good enough since the user needs to 
remember a long 3-tuple secret. 
Hopper and Blum proposed two solutions based on hard 
mathematical problems in [23]. The main problem with these 
solutions is again about usability: the password has to be long 
enough to ensure security, which makes usability relatively low. 
According to the user study reported in [23], the average login 
time of one solution (the less complicated one) is around 160 
seconds, which is too long for a practical system. One solution 
also requires the users to make intentional errors with probability 
h, which may not be an easy task for them. 
Sobrado and Birget proposed several novel graphical password 
schemes against observation attacks in [44]. One typical scheme 
called CHC (convex hull click) asks the user to click a random 
point inside a convex hull formed by three or more secret icons in 
the password. This scheme was later tested in a user study 
reported by Wiedenbeck et al. in [48]. A similar scheme called 
S3PAS was proposed in [49]. Two attacks on CHC were recently 
reported in [4]. In addition, the usability shown in [48] is not 
encouraging: the average login time is longer than 70 seconds. 
The user study was performed on a small password space of size 
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C(112,5)≈227, so the usability will be much worse if the password 
space has to be enlarged significantly. 
In [34], Li and Shum suggested some basic principles of designing 
challenge-response protocols against observation attack. They also 
proposed two general protocols called Twins and Foxtail, which 
are based on making balanced errors and hiding direct responses 
to attackers, respectively. A Foxtail protocol and a graphical 
implementation were also reported. No cryptanalysis has been 
reported, but the usability of the graphical implementation is 
questionable, since the average login time is considerably long. 
Jameel et al. proposed a new image-based solution in [25] and 
shortly after extended it for devices with limited display [26]. This 
solution is based on a hidden rule classifying an image pool into 
two different sets. One major problem with this design is the 
conflict between the automation of the classification process and 
security against automated attack. However, if the classification 
process has to be done manually by the user, the usability will be 
low since the image pool needs to be large. 
In [47], Weinshall proposed two new solutions based on image 
recognition capabilities of humans. Golle and Wagner showed that 
both solutions are insecure against SAT (satisfiability solver) 
attack [11]. This attack requires only a small number of 
observations. In addition to the security problem, the usability of 
Weinshall’s solutions is also questionable: the user has to 
remember more than 30 pictures as the password. 
Bai et al. proposed a new observation-resistant human 
authentication scheme called PAS in [7]. PAS uses different parts 
of the password for different login sessions and the user’s 
responses are obfuscated by randomized challenge and response 
tables. In [31], Li et al. show that part of the password can be 
revealed with a number of observations, thus leading to a 
degradation of the PAS scheme to a common OTP (one-time-
password) system but with worse usability. 
In [30] Lei et al. proposed a virtual password system against 
observation attack. They base the system on a randomized linear 
function. However, in [32] Li et al. pointed out that this virtual 
password system is not secure because an equivalent password 
can always be derived with only two or a few more observations. 
Very recently Asghar et al. proposed a scheme in [5], which is 
based on a many-to-one nonlinear mapping to hide the direct 
response. While it is still too early to say if this solution is indeed 
secure, its usability does not seem to be very encouraging: the 
average login time was estimated to be 213 seconds, even slower 
than Hopper-Blum protocol proposed in [23]. 
Instead of trying to design a solution secure against general 
observation attack, some solutions relax the security requirements 
to target only the weakest observation attack: shoulder surfing 
with a very limited number (say, three) of passive observations. 
Examples of these solutions include some graphical passwords 
[12,16,42], which offers limited security against observation 
attack by exposing only partial information of the password in 
each login session. An interesting comparative study on simple 
shoulder surfing performed by human observers on Passfaces (a 
commercial graphical password scheme [40]) and textual 
passwords was reported in [45], which reveals that Passfaces with 
keyboard input is the strongest setting and strong textual password 
is the weakest one.  
While most previous work does not require any hardware device, 
some other solutions employ special devices so that the challenges 
and/or the responses are completely or partially unobservable. 
Devices of this kind include eye-gazing devices [19], haptic/tactile 
input devices [8-10,15,21,27,28,36,43], headphone/earphone 
[9,21,41], mobile phones [9,14], and so on. The use of eye-gazing 
devices can obviously make the responses R invisible to human 
observers, but it is still possible to install hidden eye-tracking 
devices to read the user’s eye movements. Solutions based on 
other partly/completely unobservable devices have close links to 
Undercover [43,21], the observation-resistant solution studied in 
this paper, and are described in the next section. 
Human users are known for being unreliable to behave properly to 
protect their passwords [1]. Previous research has also shown that 
different kinds of insecure human behavior can compromise the 
security of some password systems [13,14,29]. However, how 
human behavior influence the security of many ad hoc designs of 
human authentication systems remains largely unexplored.  
3. UNDERCOVER AND SIMILAR 
SOLUTIONS 
Since observation attacks are mainly performed in visual form, 
most solutions based on unobservable challenges and/or responses 
aim at preventing the attacker’s visible access to challenges and/or 
responses. Mainly two kinds of devices are employed to achieve 
this goal: haptic/tactile devices, and audio devices. In the 
following, we first introduce Undercover [43,21] in detail and 
then briefly overview some similar solutions [2,8-
10,14,15,27,28,36,41]. 
3.1 Undercover: Original Design 
Undercover is based on the idea of “partially observable 
challenges”: the challenges C are split into public challenges Cp 
and hidden challenges Ch. For Undercover, the relationship 
between the challenge, the response and the shared secret becomes 
R=f(Cp,Ch,S), where only Cp and R are observable to the attacker. 
Clearly, if Ch and S have the same number of possible values and 
the same entropy, it is possible to conceal S perfectly with Ch. 
The device used in Undercover is a haptic device covered by the 
user’s palm, which is supposed to be unobservable to passive 
attackers. In the prototype system reported in [43], a trackball 
driven by two servo motors is used as the haptic device. The 
trackball has five different “vibrate” modes (i.e., hidden 
challenges): upward rotation, downward rotation, leftward 
rotation, rightward rotation, and vibration. The five hidden 
challenges are referred to as “Left”, “Right”, “Up”, “Down” and 
“Center” in this paper, respectively. Each hidden challenge 
corresponds to a different layout of five buttons as shown in 
Figure 1, which is used to input the response by pressing one of 
the five buttons “1”, “2”, “3”, “4” and “5” locating near the 
trackball. The input device of the Undercover prototype is a box 
as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1: Five button layouts of the Undercover prototype, 
corresponding to the five hidden challenges (Fig. 7 in [43]). 
The Undercover prototype is built on top of a graphical password 
scheme. The user selects five pass-pictures from an image pool to 
form his/her password. The system selects 23 more distractor 
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pictures to create the user’s portfolio. Each login session is 
composed of seven challenges, and each challenge contains: 1) a 
hidden challenge transmitted via the trackball, and 2) a public 
challenge – four pictures and a “no pass-picture” icon shown on 
the monitor of the terminal computer (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 2: The input device box of the Undercover prototype 
(Fig. 5a in [43]). 
 
Figure 3: A public challenge composed of four pictures and a 
“no pass-picture” icon (Fig. 9b in [43]). 
To avoid potential security problems, the Undercover prototype 
system is designed so that five public challenges contain one pass-
picture and the other two contain no pass-picture. Each pass-
picture and distractor picture in a user’s portfolio is shown once 
and only once in a login session. However, [43] does not make it 
clear how the seven public challenges should be generated in each 
login session. One may understand that the public challenges are 
fixed over all login sessions or randomized from session to 
session. In Sec. 4.3.1 we will show insecurity against an 
intersection attack when randomized public challenges are used. 
To make a correct response to a challenge, the user needs to 
derive a “hidden response” first: 1) if there is a pass-picture in the 
public challenge, derive the hidden response (1, 2, 3, or 4) 
according to the position of the pass-picture among the four 
pictures; 2) if there is no pass-picture, the hidden response is 5 
(i.e., the position of the “no pass-picture” icon). Then, the user 
looks for the hidden response in the button layout corresponding 
to the hidden challenge and presses the button matching the 
location of the hidden response in the correct button layout. For 
instance, if the hidden response is 3 (i.e., the third picture in the 
public challenge is a pass-picture) and the hidden challenge is 
“Right”, the user needs to press button “2” because the hidden 
response appears on the 2nd button of the “Right” button layout. 
Given one observed login session, the password space of the 
Undercover prototype is 5 57 4 20480 C , which is larger than a 
4-digit PIN. Under the assumption that the hidden challenges are 
unobservable, the Undercover system is believed secure even if an 
infinite number of login sessions are observed. From an 
information-theoretic point of view, this is equal to the claim that 
the password-related information leaked in each login session is 0. 
The median login time of the Undercover prototype system is 32 
seconds, which is much better than previous solutions. The overall 
failure rate is 26%, which is rather high but could be significantly 
reduced after the user becomes more familiar with the system. 
Hayashi et al. also proposed to show distorted pictures in the 
public challenge to increase the security of the system against 
human observers (as proposed in [22]). However, this method is 
not very useful for attacks performed by hidden cameras so it will 
not be considered in this paper. 
3.2 Undercover: Alternative Designs 
In addition to the original Undercover design, in [21] Hasegawa et 
al. from the same research group proposed two alternative 
designs. The main goal is to reduce the size of the system. To 
further simplify the design, a 4-digit PIN is used as the underlying 
password and the public challenge Cp is removed. 
One design is based on six vibrating tactile devices covered by the 
user’s five fingers and his/her palm. To generate a hidden 
challenge, one of the tactile devices covered by the user’s five 
fingers will vibrate to select a column of the 2×5 matrix shown in 
Figure 4. The tactile device covered by the user’s palm vibrates to 
determine the row of the 2×5 matrix. The vibrating statuses of all 
the six tactile devices then determine a hidden challenge – a 
specific element of the 2×5 matrix. Note that the ten elements of 
the 2×5 matrix are labeled with numbers from 0 to 9. So the 
hidden challenge is actually a number between 0 and 9, which will 
henceforth be referred to as the “hidden digit” in this paper. 
 
Figure 4: An alternative Undercover design (Fig. 1b in [21]). 
To make a correct response, the user needs to find out his/her 
current PIN digit in the 2×5 matrix and then presses the four arrow 
buttons in Figure 4 to show a route from the PIN digit to the 
hidden digit. This process repeats four times so that the user can 
input all the four PIN digits. 
Another design proposed in [21] is similar to the tactile one, but 
the hidden challenges are sent to the user via an audio channel, 
i.e., via a headphone set. 
3.3 Similar Solutions 
There are some other early designs for human authentication 
based on haptic/tactile devices with/without using the concept of 
hidden challenges. The main goal of these systems is mainly to 
resist shoulder-surfers, the simplest form of observation attacks. 
The solution in [36] involves pressure of a haptic pen as part of 
the password, thus making the password input partly unobservable 
to shoulder surfers. The solution called TAS (Tactile 
Authentication System) in [27,28] uses the VT Player tactile 
mouse to transmit hidden challenges to the user for entering the 
password without the worry of being observed. The design 
reported in [15] is very similar to TAS but the VT player tactile 
mouse is replaced by solenoids pins that can raise and lower their 
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positions. The solution in [2] analyzes haptic information in 
handwritten signatures to achieve the goal of user identification. 
Some more solutions were inspired by Undercover. At CHI’2009, 
De Luca et al. proposed a scheme called VibraPass, which uses 
the user’s mobile phone as the receiver of hidden challenges (a 
signal telling the user to make a true or false response) to avoid 
possible manipulation of the haptic devices by attackers [14]. De 
Luca et al. noticed a possible timing attack related to “confused 
waiting” (the user responds slower to “false” hidden challenges 
due to confusion) that can lead to password disclosure. 
At CHI’2010, Bianchi et al. proposed a solution called Secure 
Haptic Keypad (SHK), which combines the tactile device and 
input buttons to make a uni-modal haptic password [10]. SHK can 
achieve similar usability to the original Undercover design in 
terms of average login time. In [8,9], Bianchi et al. proposed a 
number of other uni-modal designs based on haptic and audio 
hidden cues (i.e., hidden challenges) to achieve user identification. 
Their user studies showed that a shorter average login time and a 
login error rate can be achieved with the uni-modal designs. 
At FC’2010, Perković et al. proposed three alternative designs 
based on audio channels, which have a much shorter average login 
time (less than 13 seconds) [41]. Perković et al. also pointed out 
that a side channel timing attack can reduce the PIN digit entropy, 
due to the user’s nonuniform response time to challenges. 
4. PROPOSED ATTACKS 
In theory, Undercover-like solutions can achieve perfect secrecy 
since the shared secret S can be perfectly “encrypted” by the 
hidden challenge Ch. Unfortunately, this is not always true 
because careless designs can leak information about S and/or Ch. 
Our studies on the original Undercover design in [43] and the two 
alternative designs in [21] led to the discovery of such design 
flaws, which allow an attacker to completely break the password 
with considerably high probability with only O(10) observed login 
sessions or reduce the password space if an insufficient number of 
login sessions are collected. We have developed two attacks: a 
timing attack on the original Undercover design and an 
intersection attack on all Undercover designs. The timing attack is 
based on a careless design flaw of the button layout, which leads 
to nonuniform behavior of the user’s responses to hidden 
challenges. In the following, we separately describe the two 
attacks and their real performance verified via user studies on our 
own implementation of Undercover. 
4.1 Our implementation of Undercover 
Before introducing the two attacks, we first briefly describe how 
we implemented Undercover and how we collected the data to 
analyze the performance of the attacks. 
To ease our study, we avoided using any special hardware and 
implemented the whole system in software. We use the audio 
channel to transmit the hidden challenges and Passfaces [40] as 
the underlying graphical scheme. The same button layouts in the 
original Undercover design are used. The five buttons are shown 
as press buttons on our software GUI. Users are allowed to make 
responses via mouse (by pressing one of the push buttons) or 
keyboard (by pressing <1>, <2>, <3>, <4> or <5>). Those 
changes have no influence on the security of Undercover against 
the proposed attacks. Figure 5 shows what a public challenge 
looks like in our implementation. We mask the faces in Figure 5 
to avoid violating the affected people’s privacy. 
We performed user studies on our implementation at two 
universities located in two countries: the University of Split in 
Croatia and the National University of Science and Technology 
(NUST) in Pakistan. Neither university requires IRB reviews on 
research work involving human subjects, so the user studies were 
carried out without such a review. The University of Konstanz has 
no established policy on usable security research, but an approval 
from the Chair of the Ethics Committee was secured. Although a 
formal IRB review was not required, we took all possible 
measures to make sure that all legal and ethical issues we could 
think of were properly handled. For instance, all users were well 
informed in advance (before the user studies) about the purpose of 
the study and how the data would be processed and used in our 
paper. All the data collected from users was shared only among 
the coauthors of the paper. 
 
Figure 5: Our Undercover implementation. 
Part of the reason why we ran the user studies in two different 
countries is to see if users with different cultural backgrounds and 
of different races share similar nonuniform human behavior that 
makes the timing attack a universal attack. In total, 28 users 
participated. All users are university students and staff members in 
departments of electronic engineering and computer science. 
Among the 28 users, 19 performed the study at the University of 
Split in Croatia and 9 at the National University of Science and 
Technology (NUST) in Pakistan. The gender ratio is 22:6 (22 
males and 6 females). The ages of the 28 users range from 20 to 
40 years old. All the participants were voluteers who were asked 
to help our research, and none of them was economically 
compensated/motivated, so we believe that our data is not biased 
towards positive results of our proposed attacks. 
At the beginning of the user studies, the users were given a short 
tutorial of the system. A questionnaire was issued to each user to 
collect personal information and knowledge on computer/web 
technology and password security. Then, they were asked to log in 
at least once a day during a one-month period. To have a better 
control over the environment of the user studies, we set up a 
computer running the Undercover system in our labs and users 
needed to come to our labs physically for performing the logins. 
Users who forgot to come within 24 hours were automatically 
reminded via emails. Despite the reminding mechanism, not all 
users followed our request strictly, so at the end of our user 
studies different users have different numbers of recorded login 
sessions, but no user dropped during the course of the user studies. 
The minimum number of login attempts made by a user is 20, the 
maximum number is 66, and the median is 26.5. In total we 
collected 918 login attempts, among which 771 are successful 
ones, leading to an overall login success rate around 84%. The 
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login success rates of all users range from 66.67% to 100% and 
the median rate is 84.82%. Among all the 28 users, 18 used the 
keyboard as the input device while others used the mouse. 
Login data of the 28 users were stored in an XML database for 
further processing. The login data provide information including 
public/hidden challenges and responses, the response time of each 
challenge, the overall login time, input device used to make each 
response, if a login attempt is successful, at which location the 
login attempt was made, which user made each login attempt.  
Compared with the original Undercover implementation in [43], 
our implementation has comparable usability in terms of average 
login time. The median login time is 30.1 seconds, slightly shorter 
than the original Undercover implementation (32 seconds). Note 
that the average login time steadily decreased as the users became 
more familiar with the system. After 20 logins, the median login 
time decreased to 21.8 seconds.  
The data collected from Croatian and Pakistani participants show 
some statistical differences, e.g., most Pakistani participants used 
mouse while most Croatia participants used keyboard as the input 
device, but our analysis showed that such differences do not have 
a major impact on the effectiveness of the proposed attacks. The 
different choices on input devices may be partly explained by the 
personal choices of our coordinators to demonstrate the system 
during the introduction stage: the Pakistani and Croatian 
coordinators used the mouse and the keyboard, respectively. 
4.2 Timing Attack 
4.2.1 Nonuniform human behavior in responding to 
different hidden challenges 
Observing the five button layouts in Figure 1, we can see that the 
button layout corresponding to “Up” hidden challenge is “12345”, 
exactly the original layout of the five buttons that the user needs 
to press. In comparison, the other four button layouts are all 
circularly rotated editions of the original button layout. Since 
users do not need to do button rotation for the original button 
layout, we hypothesized that they may make responses to “Up” 
hidden challenges faster and with a lower error rate, compared to 
the other four hidden challenges. Our user study confirmed this 
hypothesis. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the average response 
times and error responses rates of all users to the five hidden 
challenges, respectively. Paired t-tests revealed that the difference 
between the user’s responses to “Up” hidden challenges and to 
other hidden challenges is significant at 5% level. 
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Figure 6: The nonuniform human behavior in the average 
response time to different hidden challenges. 
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Figure 7: The nonuniform human behavior in the average 
error response rate to different hidden challenges. 
 
Figure 8: Probability that the fastest response in a login 
session corresponds to an “Up” hidden challenge. 
This nonuniform human behavior in responding to different 
hidden challenges inspired us to propose a timing attack. Denoting 
the 28 pictures by 28 integers (from 1 to 28), the attack works as 
follows. 
 Step 1: Create 28 counters, C1,…,C28, for the 28 pictures, and 
initialize all of them with 0. 
 Step 2: For each observed login session, take the fastest 
response and assume that it corresponds to an “Up” 
challenge. Then, if the corresponding public challenge 
contains a pass-picture i, increase Ci by one. 
 Step 3: Rank all the pictures according to the values of the 28 
counters, and take the top five pictures as the five pass-
pictures forming the password. If there is more than one way 
to select the top five pictures (which can happen when some 
pictures have the same counter value), random shuffle all 
pictures with the same counter value as the fifth one, re-rank 
all the 28 pictures, and then take the new top five as the pass-
pictures. The random shuffling process is to avoid the bias 
towards pictures with smaller indices. 
Note that the random shuffling process in Step 3 means the timing 
attack may produce different results for different runs. In Section 
10.1 of the Appendix, we theoretically explain why the above 
timing attack works and then estimate its performance.  
To further improve the performance of the above timing attack, 
two additional measures can be further adopted: 1) negative 
penalty mechanism – for each distinguished decoy picture i in 
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Step 2, decrease Ci by one; 2) multiple fastest responses – use the 
fastest m=2 or 3 responses in Step 2. Both measures can 
potentially increase differences between counter values of pass-
pictures and decoy pictures. Theoretical analysis of the 
generalized timing attack is very complex, so we only show 
experimental results in the next sub-section. 
In the following, we describe the performance of the timing attack 
by applying it to the real login data collected in our user studies. 
4.2.2 Real performance of the timing attack 
We applied the timing attack to the login data collected in our user 
study, in order to verify its real performance under the following 
3×2×2=12 different settings: 
 Number of fastest response(s): m=1, 2, 3; 
 Negative penalty mechanism: on, off; 
 Login sessions used: all, successful ones only. 
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Figure 9: Success rates of breaking passwords and pass-
pictures applying the timing attack to real login data. 
The performance of the above 12 settings of the timing attack on 
real login data is shown in Figure 9. The two sub-figures 
correspond to 5tp  and 
*
5tp , respectively. It is interesting that the 
real performance is similar to the one estimated in the theoretical 
analysis. Among all the 12 settings, Settings 3 (solid line marked 
with “”), 4 (solid line marked with “”) and 8 (dashed line 
marked with “”) have a better performance, which correspond 
to “m=1, without negative penalty, successful logins only”, “m=1, 
with negative penalty, successful logins only”, and “m=2, with 
negative penalty, successful logins only”, respectively.  
4.2.3 Yet another potential timing attacks 
The human behavior has many different kinds of nonuniformities 
we may exploit. Yet another nonuniformity we noticed is that 
most users tend to respond more slowly to public challenges with 
no pass-picture. Figure 10 shows the average response times of all 
users with respect to the five different hidden responses. One can 
see that the average response time is longer when the hidden 
response is “5”, i.e., when the public challenge does not contain a 
pass-picture. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that 
the user has to look at all the four pictures (potentially twice) to 
make sure there is indeed no any pass-picture. We tested this new 
timing attack using the same strategy: 1) pick the m slowest 
responses in each login session; 2) assuming this response 
correspond to a public challenge with no pass-picture, decrease 
the counters of the four distinguished decoy pictures by one; 3) 
rank the counters of all pictures and pick the top five ranked 
pictures to form the password. Simulated attacks on the real login 
data did not produce good results. None of the users’ passwords 
was completely broken, and the success rate of breaking pass-
pictures ranges from 0 to 0.4. We attribute the failure of the attack 
to the larger variance of the response time to the public challenge 
with no pass-picture (which can be seen in Figure 10). Although 
this timing attack was unsuccessful on our dataset, it remains a 
potential threat since some pass-pictures may still be broken. 
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Figure 10: Average response times with respect to different 
hidden responses. 
4.3 Intersection Attack 
Intersection attack is not new and has been reported in previous 
research on other human authentication systems especially 
graphical passwords [16]. The basic idea behind intersection 
attack is to fuse the information obtained in multiple observed 
login sessions to reduce the space of password space (i.e., the 
password entropy). This subsection presents intersection attacks 
on the original and alternative designs of Undercover in [43,21]. 
4.3.1 Breaking the original Undercover design with 
randomized public challenges 
In [43], the system is designed so that each pass-picture and decoy 
picture is shown once and only once in a single authentication 
process. Unfortunately, showing each picture only once is not a 
sufficient condition to maintain the security. In fact, how the 
public challenges are generated also matters. In this sub-
subsection, we show that the password can be exposed with O(10) 
observed login sessions if randomized public challenges are used. 
In [43] it was not made clear how public challenges should be 
generated. Our communications with the authors of [43] revealed 
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that they implemented their prototype system with fixed public 
challenges, so their prototype does not suffer from the security 
problem discussed in this sub-subsection. However, since this 
issue was not discussed in [43], a reader might assume that 
randomizing public challenges is still fine or even beneficial 
because randomness often helps enhance the security of a system. 
Therefore, the intersection attack in this sub-subsection shows 
how important such small design details are for a secure system. 
Each public challenge exposes a significant amount of information 
about the password due to the following fact: each public 
challenge (i.e., a set of four pictures) contains at most one (i.e., 
either none or one) pass-picture. This means that a candidate 
password can be excluded if two or more pass-pictures in this 
candidate password appear in a public challenge. In other words, 
observation of one public challenge can lead to a reduction of the 
password space. Therefore, as the number of observed public 
challenges increases, the password space will become smaller and 
smaller and finally the real password will be revealed after a 
number of login sessions are observed. For n given observed 
public challenges, the reduced password space can be 
mathematically calculated as the intersection of the reduced 
password spaces corresponding to the n public challenges; hence 
we call this attack an “intersection attack”. The real attack is 
performed in a simpler way: 
 Step 1: Set P to be the space of all possible passwords. 
 Step 2: For each observed public challenge, reduce the space 
of candidate passwords P by checking each password in P 
and removing invalid ones. 
 Step 3: Repeat Step 2 until all observed challenges are 
processed or the size of P becomes 1. 
The above attack can be theoretically analyzed to get how quickly 
the password space is reduced and how many observed login 
sessions may be needed to get the password with high probability. 
See Section 10.2 of the Appendix for such a theoretical analysis. 
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Figure 11: The size of reduced password space in an 
intersection attack on the original Undercover design. 
To verify the real performance of the above intersection attack, we 
did MATLAB simulations on the original Undercover system with 
15 randomly generated login sessions (i.e., 105 public challenges). 
The experimental results showed that the actual number of 
observed login sessions for uniquely revealing the password is 
seven to ten in most cases. A typical simulation result is shown in 
Figure 11. We performed the intersection attack on real login data 
collected in our user studies, and the passwords of all 28 users 
were successfully broken. The number of required login sessions 
ranges from eight to eleven, and the median number is nine. 
4.3.2 Breaking alternative Undercover designs 
For the two alternative designs proposed in [21], the same 
intersection attack still works but in a slightly different way. Now 
no public challenge is available, but the user’s response becomes 
the source of information leakage. This is due to a flaw in the 
alternative designs: for different PIN digits and hidden digits, the 
user needs to press different sequences of arrow buttons to make a 
correct response. As a result, the buttons presses and their order 
can leak information of the PIN and hidden digits. 
This problem can be best explained by an example. Assume the 
PIN digit is 2 and the hidden digit is 6. To make a correct 
response, the user needs to press Button “Left” (◄) and Button 
“Down” (▼) (the order does not matter). Obviously, pressing 
Button “Down” leaks the information that the PIN digit is in the 
first row. Similarly, pressing Button “Left” reveals that the PIN 
digit must not be 0. As a whole, the number of possible PIN digits 
is reduced from ten to only four (1, 2, 3 or 4). 
Button press 
pattern Possible PIN digits Possible hidden digits 
▼ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
▲ 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 
◄ 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 
► 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 
◄◄ 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 0, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 
►► 0, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 
◄◄◄ 3, 4, 8, 9 0, 1, 5, 6 
►►► 0, 1, 5, 6 3, 4, 8, 9 
◄◄◄◄ 4, 9 0, 5 
►►►► 0, 5 4, 9 
Table 1: Information leaked from different button presses. 
PIN digit Combinations of button press patterns 
Occurrence probability in n 
responses 
0 ▼ + ►►►► 
  1 0.5 1 0.8n n   4 ▼ + ◄◄◄◄ 5 ▲ + ►►►► 
9 ▲ + ◄◄◄◄ 
1 ▼ + ►►► + ◄* 
  1 0.5 1 0.6 2 0.8   n n n
 
3 ▼ + ► + ◄◄◄* 
6 ▲ + ►►► + ◄* 
8 ▲ + ► + ◄◄◄* 
2 ▼ + ►► + ◄◄* 
7 ▲ + ►► + ◄◄* 
* For the combinations revealing PIN digits 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8, the 
second and the third button press patterns should appear in two 
different responses to a challenge at the same position of two 
different login sessions; otherwise they will completely or partly 
cancel each other. The first button press pattern can appear in the 
same response as the other two.1 
Table 2: Combinations of button presses that are sufficient to 
uniquely reveal the ten PIN digits. 
Table 1 shows a list of different button press patterns that can leak 
information about PIN digits, where the occurrence probability of 
                                                                 
1  For instance, we may have two responses to the second 
challenge of two different login sessions: ▼►►► and ▼◄, 
which reveal that the second PIN digit is 1. 
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each case assuming that each PIN digit and each hidden digit 
distribute uniformly in {0,…,9}. Here, we ignore button presses 
that cancel each other, e.g. one “Left” followed by one “Right” or 
one “Up” followed by one “Down”. From Table 1, we can see that 
a combination of some button press patterns can lead to a unique 
determination of the PIN digit. Such combinations of button press 
patterns are enumerated in Table 2, with their occurrence 
probability in n responses to n random challenges (see Section 
10.3 of the Appendix for the calculation of the occurrence 
probabilities). Note that there is only one response corresponding 
to each PIN digit in a single login session. 
Based on the occurrence probabilities in Table 2, we can estimate 
how many login sessions are needed to uniquely recover a PIN 
digit with probability q: 
 When the PIN digit is 0, 4, 5, or 9: (1 0.5 )(1 0.8 )  n n q . 
This inequality can be solved numerically to get n≥n1 (q). 
 When the PIN digit is 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, or 8: 
(1 0.5 )(1 0.6 2 0.8 )    n n n q . This inequality can be 
solved numerically to get n≥n2 (q). 
When each PIN digit is uniquely determined with probability q, 
the whole 4-digit PIN is uniquely determined with probability q4. 
To make q4≥0.5, we need to have q≥0.8409. When q=0.8409, we 
can calculate n1(q)=9 and n2(q)=12. This means that, given twelve 
login sessions, the 4-digit PIN can always be uniquely determined 
with probability no less than 0.5. If the PIN is composed of 0, 4, 5 
and 9 only, nine observed login sessions will be enough. 
We did a large number of MATLAB simulations to test the real 
performance of the intersection attack. For a PIN “1236”, 1000 
random attacks showed that the median number of login sessions 
needed to uniquely reveal the whole PIN is eleven. For a PIN 
“0459”, the median number is nine. One can see that the attack 
works very well and our theoretical analysis is very accurate. 
Since we did not implement this alternative design of Undercover, 
the attack was not validated by real login data from a user study. 
But the attack does not depend on human behavior at all, so a re-
validation via a user study is not really necessary. 
5. ENHANCING UNDERCOVER 
As we described above, the two proposed attacks are based on 
some flaws in the original and alternative designs of Undercover. 
By removing these design flaws, we can enhance the security of 
Undercover. To simplify our discussion, here we only focus on 
how to enhance the original Undercover design. 
To resist the intersection attack, we should avoid information 
leaked from public challenges. This means that we need to use a 
fixed set of seven public challenges in all login sessions (as the 
authors of [43] implemented their Undercover prototype). If the 
order of the seven public challenges in each login session and the 
order of the four pictures in each public challenge should also be 
fixed is an issue for future study. It remains a question if fixing 
either order or both can lead to other new attacks. 
To resist the timing attack, we need to make the five button 
layouts equally difficult for human users to handle. Randomly 
shuffling them is a simple way to achieve this goal. The shuffling 
can be done dynamically for each challenge to minimize any 
potential nonuniformity of human users’ response time to different 
hidden challenges. 
We developed an enhanced edition of our Undercover 
implementation by adopting the above two measures. A two-week 
user study with 22 participants was performed to verify its 
performance against the timing attack, i.e., if human users can 
now respond to hidden challenges more uniformly. The same 
protocol as the user studies on the original Undercover scheme 
was followed for this new user study. All participants also 
attended the previous user study, except one new user who was 
recruited for testing this new enhanced design. The average 
response times become flatter as shown in Figure 12. However, 
paired t-tests showed that the average response time to “Up” 
hidden challenges is still significantly shorter than the average 
response time to hidden challenges “Left”, “Right” and “Center” 
(although with much smaller p-values).  
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Figure 12: Average response times and error response rates to 
different hidden challenges of the Undercover implementation 
enhanced by shuffling button layouts. 
After discussing with some participants, we noticed a possible 
explanation to the still shorter response time to “Up” hidden 
challenges. Observing Figure 1, we can see that the button layout 
corresponding to “Up” hidden challenges is the closest to the 
public challenge. Some participants recalled that they had spent 
more time in locating other button layouts and verifying them.  
To further remove the new kind of nonuniformity in human 
behavior, we realized that it is important to re-arrange the user 
interface so that the distance between each button layout and the 
public challenge is equal. Further analysis showed that we should 
also equalize the distance between the pass-picture and the button 
layout used by the user to make the public response. This led to a 
new design of the interface of the Undercover as shown in Figure 
13. Now we distribute the four pictures in each public challenge 
uniformly on a circle, and the “no pass-picture” icon at the center 
of the circle. The five button layouts are located in the same way 
as the five pictures. To further simplify the user interface, we also 
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changed the hidden responses to “1”, “2”, “3”, “4” and “5” and 
the user is asked to: 1) find the hidden response in the button 
layout near to the pass-picture or the “no pass-picture” icon; 2) 
press the button at the same location as the hidden response to 
make the public response. The above changes make the interface 
tighter and the user’s task simpler, so we expect the usability of 
the system can also be improved. 
 
Figure 13: The new layout of our enhanced Undercover 
implementation. 
In the design process of the new enhanced Undercover 
implementation, we noticed a new kind of nonuniformity that may 
lead to a new timing attack: if all the 5 pass-pictures have 
appeared in the first five or six public challenges, the user knows 
that all the remaining (one or two) public challenge(s) will contain 
no pass-picture so that he/she may be able to respond faster than 
the usual case. To avoid this problem, we changed the design so 
that the last public challenge always contains one pass-picture. 
This measure has a side effect on the success rate of random 
guess, which is increased from  2 571 4 1 / 21504 C  to 
 2 561 4 1 / 15360 C , around 1.4 times larger. Since 1/15360 is 
still smaller than 10–4, the side effect is acceptable. 
A one-week user study with 19 users was then performed to check 
if this new enhancement works. All 19 users are old users who 
had participated in previous user studies. Unlike our previous user 
studies, each user was asked to login five to ten times per day so 
that we can collect enough data for analysis. Figure 14 shows the 
results obtained from real login data. Now the paired t-test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that the response time to Hidden 
Challenge “1” has the same mean as the response time to other 
hidden challenges, thus leading us to believe that the response 
times to different hidden challenges are not significantly different. 
Simulated attacks on the enhanced Undercover implementation 
showed that none of the user passwords was broken. The success 
rate of breaking pass-pictures is always below 50%. In addition, 
as we expected, the average login times and the login error rates 
are both improved compared to the original Undercover design: 
the average login time is reduced to less than 19 seconds after 20 
logins and the error rate over all 19 users is just around 6%. We 
believe that the average login time can be reduced to within 10 
seconds after the user becomes more familiar with the system and 
her password. While this is still significantly longer than the 
average time of entering a 4-digit PIN, it is likely that we have to 
pay some additional costs for getting the additional security 
against passive observers. It remains a question if an even better 
design can be made to further reduce the average login time. 
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Figure 14: Average response times and error response rates to 
different hidden challenges, of the Undercover implementation 
enhanced with the new interface in Figure 13. 
6. Generalizing Timing Attack 
The idea of timing attack may also be generalized to break other 
human authentication systems based on hidden challenges. For 
instance, the uni-modal designs proposed in [8,9] ask the user to 
rotate an input device to match a target (which is a secret 
password item) cued via a tactile or audio channel. It is obvious 
that the response time depends on how far the current cue is from 
the target. In addition, for different targets, the average response 
time should be different because the average distance from a 
random cue to the target is different. For instance, assuming that 
the list of possible cues/targets are 0,…,9 and they follow a 
predetermined fixed order, then the targets 4 and 5 have the 
minimum average response time. By further considering the 
direction of the overall rotation, one can further distinguish 4 and 
5. In the same manner one can distinguish all targets. If such a 
timing attack works in practice will be part of our future research. 
Although the timing attack is proposed to break Undercover-like 
human authentication schemes as ad hoc designs, the reason why 
it works for Undercover has its root in the way how a normal 
human user responds to visual challenges that require mental 
efforts: she needs to first look for visual patterns of her interest, 
interpret it properly, then compute the correct response and finally 
makes the response by moving her body and/or finger(s). If any of 
the four steps has a dependency on the contents of the challenge, 
the user may respond differently to different challenges. Such a 
behavioral difference may lead to an effective timing attack. If 
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there is more than one kind of such human behavior, different 
combinations of them may lead to different timing attacks. In case 
the password cannot be completely broken, the information leaked 
may be useful to reduce the password space thus making a brute 
force attack feasible. Considering the fact that human behavior 
can be nonuniform and highly nonlinear in many aspects, the 
exploitation space of attack based on human behavior may be 
much larger than what we think of. Note that timing attack may 
not be the only form of human behavior based attacks. In the 
following, we briefly discuss different aspects that may lead to 
human behavior attacks on human authentication systems. 
Response time. This has been shown clearly by the timing attack 
on Undercover designs proposed in this paper and previous 
research on some other systems like PIN input devices and 
VibraPass [13,14,29]. There are different sources of 
nonuniformity that may be exploited by an attacker to launch a 
successful timing attack. For instance, for graphical password 
systems based on an image pool [16,22,23,25,26,34,40,44,47], the 
user’s response to a challenge may be faster if the (average) 
distance of the pass-picture(s) to the left upper corner of the 
displayed challenge and/or the pass-picture(s) are more visually 
attractive or eye-catching (due to their colors or patterns or 
semantics). In addition, depending on the personal nature of a 
given user, she may be more sensitive to specific challenges and 
response slower or faster than average. As a typical example, 
color blind users will respond slower to color patterns that fall into 
their color vision deficiency, so a careless design of the challenges 
may lead to an additional risk that does not exist for users with 
normal color vision. Considering the fact that a considerable 
percentage of the whole population are suffering from color 
blindness (e.g., 8% Caucasian males and 0.5% Caucasian females 
[18]), this effect may not be negligible for graphical password 
systems. Recall that Undercover was also designed to work with 
distorted images which will likely make the distinguishability of 
pass-pictures from decoy pictures more dependent on color 
differences and thus may lead to a higher risk of a timing attack 
on color blind users. 
Response error rate. Similar to nonuniform response time, the 
nonuniformity of response errors may also be used to develop a 
similar human behavior based attack. For instance, some graphical 
password systems (e.g., those reported in [23,34] require the user 
to count the number of pass-pictures in each challenge, which 
implies that for some (if not all) users the response error rate may 
increase as the number of pass-pictures. By observing if a user 
failed a login session and how many times she re-tried, an attacker 
may get some useful information to reduce the password space. 
Note that once having made a mistake, the user may be more 
careful and be slower in the second login attempt and spend more 
time on confusing challenges, therefore, an attacker may further 
get more useful information about the challenge(s) for which the 
user made wrong responses. In case the attacker is allowed to 
impersonate the server, he can present carefully constructed 
challenges to induce login failures. 
Mental computation. One of the reasons why our proposed timing 
attack works for Undercover is that human users need different 
amounts of mental efforts to handle different hidden challenges. 
Since all human authentication systems require the user to do 
some mental computation (recalling, counting, recognizing, 
comparing, calculating, etc.), there is always a potential risk that 
some kind of nonuniformity exists so that an effective timing 
attack can be developed based on it.  
Temporal variation. The response time and the response error rate 
of a human user may vary and evolve during the course of using 
the system. It is also possible that a user becomes “smarter” after 
using a password system for a long time so that she creates some 
shortcuts to make faster responses to some challenges with a 
higher probability. This may create new attacks or improving the 
performance of existing attacks. For instance, the unsuccessful 
timing attack described in Section 4.2.3 may start working after 
the user becomes very familiar with the system and her pass-
pictures and the seven fixed public challenges if she can locate 
pass-pictures faster and make quicker responses than before.  
Personal preference. Previous research [11] has shown the 
important role of personal preference in the security of graphical 
password systems. It is likely that some users may suffer from a 
higher risk of timing attack if they select weak passwords linked 
to their personal preference. One consequence is a possible change 
of the response pattern. For the original Undercover design, the 
time gap between the response times to public challenges with and 
without pass-pictures may become larger or some new time gaps 
may appear. Note that it may not be easy (if not impossible) to 
completely avoid personal preference for graphical passwords 
since the users do need some semantic clues to help them 
remember their passwords. As a consequence, in principle there is 
always an exploitable personal preference that can potentially be 
used by an attacker. In addition, it deserves noting that the cultural 
and religious backgrounds normally play an important role in a 
user’s preference. In our user studies, although no exploitable 
difference was observed between the Croatian and Pakistani 
groups for the proposed timing attack, it remains a question if a 
different attack can be developed by exploiting some statistical 
differences we missed during the user study or such an attack 
exists for other human authentication systems. 
Facial expression and hand/body movement. For human 
authentication systems against passive observers, the attacker can 
install a hidden video camera to record the login sessions. He may 
also install a secondary hidden camera to record the facial 
expression and hand/body movement of the user during the login 
sessions. This point is also discussed in [43], where Sasamoto et 
al. observed that some users moved their hands improperly to leak 
information about the hidden challenge or the pass-picture. In 
addition to hand movement, the user’s facial expression may also 
leak information about the hidden challenge or the pass-picture. 
For instance, when a public challenge without any pass-picture is 
shown, the user may look less relaxed than when a public 
challenge with a pass-picture is presented. Similarly, when all the 
five pass-pictures have been shown so the user knows the last 
public challenge will not contain any pass-picture, she may appear 
very relaxed and move her eyes towards the button layout without 
looking at the computer screen before making the last response. 
The above discussion is very general and can in principle apply to 
all human authentication systems. In our opinion, every human 
authentication system must be carefully evaluated against human 
behavior attacks by considering all the above points. As a general 
rule, the user interface should be designed in such a way that most 
human users will not have distinguishable nonuniform behavior. 
In some cases, educating users may also help mitigate the risk, but 
it is desirable to avoid user education since users are well-known 
for not behaving very well even after being educated. In our future 
work, we will investigate if similar human behavior based attacks 
exist in other human authentication systems especially other 
recognition and recall based graphical password systems. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
This paper reports two practical attacks to Undercover, a human 
authentication system proposed at CHI’2008 which was believed 
to be secure against observation attacks. We reveal security 
weaknesses in Undercover due to some design flaws and insecure 
human behaviors. We also proposed some enhancements to make 
Undercover more secure against the proposed attacks. User 
studies were carried out to verify both our proposed attacks and 
the performance of the suggested enhancements. 
Our work has implications beyond gauging the security of 
Undercover as an ad hoc design. Our results reemphasize that 
designers of security systems should pay special attention to the 
human-computer interfaces of their systems. More specifically, 
the attacks proposed in this paper demonstrate that, if meticulous 
care is not exercised in measuring how human users will perceive 
and operate a security system, user behavior can reveal sensitive 
information that can be used to break the system. Our work on 
enhancing Undercover also showed that usable solutions to 
insecure human behaviors are not always intuitively obvious. 
In our future work, we plan to generalize the timing attack to other 
Undercover-like designs and other human authentication systems. 
We will also look for new Undercover designs that can lead to a 
shorter login time and a lower login error rate. One possible 
direction is to explore uni-modal designs that remove the public 
challenges since some previous work suggests that they 
unnecessarily increase the mental work load of users. 
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10. APPENDIX 
10.1 Theoretical analysis of the timing attack 
In this subsection of the appendix, we give a theoretical analysis 
of the performance of the timing attack. The success of the timing 
attack depends on if a pass-picture has a higher probability of 
being distinguished as a pass-picture in Step 2 than a decoy 
picture. If so, a pass-picture will have a larger counter value than a 
decoy picture. Thus, pass-pictures will likely be ranked higher 
than decoy pictures in Step 3. Intuitively, increasing the number of 
login sessions will increase the probability that all pass-pictures 
are ranked as the top five pictures in Step 3, thus increase the 
success rate of the timing attack. 
In each login session, denote the probability that a pass-picture’s 
counter is increased by p1, the probability that a decoy picture’s 
counter is increased by p2, and the probability that no counter is 
increased by p3. Based on the original Undercover design, 
5p1+23p2+p3=1 should hold. There are eight events we need to 
consider for calculating the three probabilities: 
 Event 1: The login session includes at least one “Up” hidden 
challenge, which happens with a probability 
7
1 1 (1 1 / 5) 0.7903   Ep . 
 Event 2: The fastest response corresponds to an “Up” hidden 
challenge, which happens with a user-dependent probability 
2Ep . 
 Event 3: The public challenge corresponding to the fastest 
response includes a pass-picture, which happens with a 
probability 3 5 / 7 0.7143 Ep . 
 Event 4: Given that we are observing a public challenge with 
a pass-picture, the probability that a specific pass-picture 
appears in the challenge is  4 1 / 5 0.2 Ep . 
 Event 5a: The user makes a correct response to an “Up” 
hidden challenge, which happens with a user-dependent 
probability 5E ap . 
 Event 5b: The user makes a correct response to an non-“Up” 
hidden challenge, which happens with a user-dependent 
probability 5E bp . 
 Event 6: An incorrect response made by the user to a non-
“Up” hidden challenge matches the pass-picture if we 
consider the hidden challenge as “Up”, which happens with a 
user-dependent probability 6Ep .  
 Event 7: An incorrect response made by the user to an “Up” 
hidden matches a public challenge without a pass-picture, 
which happens with a user-dependent probability 7Ep . 
The pass-picture under consideration will be distinguished as a 
pass-picture under the following two situations: 
 Events 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5a happen; 
 Event 2 does not happen, Events 3, 4 and 6 happen. 
Assuming that the events are independent of each other, we have 
1 1 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 6(1 )  E E E E E a E E E Ep p p p p p p p p p . This probability is 
user dependent because 2Ep  and 5Ep  are both user dependent. 
To ease our discussion, we use the median probabilities of Events 
2 and 5 obtained in our user studies: 2 0.6583Ep , 5 0.9871E ap , 
5 0.9652E bp . For Events 6 and 7, we assume that the user 
makes incorrect responses randomly, so 6 7 1 / 4 0.25  E Ep p . 
With all the above values of those the user-dependent probabilities, 
1 0.0865p . The probability p3 is equal to 
3 3 2 5 2 5 7(1 ) ( (1 ) (1 )(1 )) 0.2894      E E E E a E E b Ep p p p p p p . From p1 
and p3, we can derive p2=(1–5p1–p3)/23≈0.0123. Since p1 is 
p1/p2≈6.96 times larger than p2, we expect that the timing attack 
should work well in practice. 
We estimated the values of p1 and p2 of each user from our real 
login data. The results are shown in Figure 15, from which we can 
see that the values of p1, p2 and p3 are indeed user dependent and 
also time varying. The actual value of p1/p2 is less than the above 
theoretical estimate, but still significantly larger than 1 for all 
users and over the whole course of logins. The inaccuracy of the 
estimate might be attributed to the inaccuracy of the theoretical 
model itself and/or some probabilities involved in the model. 
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Figure 15: Values of p1 and p2 of the median user, estimated 
from real login data. 
Although p1 is much larger than p2, the probability that all the five 
pass-pictures are ranked as top five pictures may not be high when 
the number of observed login sessions (denoted henceforth as n) is 
small. In fact, when n<5, this probability is 0 because not all pass-
pictures can appear. In general, this probability can be re-
formulated as follows. 
Randomly make n attempts of picking a ball from a box of infinite 
number of balls labeled with Numbers 1,…,28. With probability 
p1, we take a ball with a label between 1 and 5, and with 
probability p2, we take a ball with a label between 6 and 28. With 
probability p3=1–5p1–23p2, we fail to get a ball. At the end, what 
is the probability that the number of balls with label i is larger 
than the number of balls with label j for any i{1,…,5} and 
j{6,…,28}? 
Denote the above probability by pt5 and the number of Objects i 
by Ci, it can be written as a sum as follows: 
 
   
1 5 6 28
285 28
1 6 1
5 1 2 3
1 28min max ,
!
! ! !
  
   
  


  
i i ii i i
C C C C D
t
C C D n C
np p p p
C C D
. 
It is not trivial to get an explicit form of 5tp , so we used the 
Monte Carlo method to estimate 5tp  for a set of values of n, 
which are shown in Figure 16 (the line marked with “x”). We can 
see 5tp  keeps increasing as n increases. Although it is not very 
high when n is small, the value is not negligible either. For 
instance, when n=30, 5 0.0842tp  , which means that 8.42% of 
passwords can be recovered. 
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Figure 16: Values of 5tp  and 
*
5tp  for n=1,...,100. 
While the success rate of breaking the whole password (i.e., all 
the five pass-pictures) is not high when n is small, our simulations 
showed that the probability that a picture in the top five ones is a 
pass-picture (denoted by *5tp ) is significantly high. The line 
marked with “+” in Figure 16 shows the results. When n=30, 
although 5tp  is only 0.0842, 
*
5tp  is much larger: 0.6508>0.5. 
10.2 Theoretical analysis of the intersection 
attack on the original Undercover design 
We can estimate how quickly the size of P reduces as n increases. 
Assume that the reduction rate of the password space 1/ i iP P  
remains stable for all i, where Pi denotes the reduced password 
space after i public challenges are checked. To avoid 
unnecessarily complicating our theoretical analysis, we ignore the 
fact that there are exactly five public challenges with one pass-
picture. This will lead to a slightly larger key space (since less 
information leakage is counted), but the final result remains fairly 
accurate as shown in our experiments (see Sec. 4.3.1). Based on 
the above assumptions, the reduction rate is the following: 
     0 5 1 4 51 0 4 24 4 24 28# / # / 0.865r C C C C C   P P .  
The size of Pn will be 50 28#( ) n nr C rP . To uniquely reveal the 
password, the size of the reduced password space needs to be 
small enough. Since there has to be at least one element (the true 
password) in the reduced password space, when 528 1.5nC r  
(meaning that the number of wrong passwords in the reduced 
password space is smaller than 0.5) the probability that the final 
reduced password has only one element will become high, which 
leads to    528ln / 1.5 / ln 1 / 1 77    n C r . Note that one login 
session includes seven public challenges, so 77 / 7 11    
observed login sessions will be enough for an attacker to uniquely 
reveal the password with a considerably high probability. 
The computational complexity of the intersection attack is 
determined by the sum of the sizes of all reduced password 
spaces:        1 1 5 528 280 0# 1 / (1 )      n n i nii iO O C r O C r rP .  
Since the value of n will not be much larger than 11, the 
complexity will be upper bounded by 
    5 11 19.228 1 / (1 ) 2O C r r O   . 
10.3 Occurrence probabilities of combinations 
of button press patterns in alternative 
Undercover designs 
The occurrence probability of a specific combination of button 
press patterns in n responses can be calculated based on the 
probability of each button press pattern in the combination. In the 
following, we show how the two values in the last column of 
Table 2 are derived. 
When the PIN digit is 0, the combination includes two button 
press patterns: the first one is ▼, and the second is ►►►►. To 
calculate the occurrence probability of the pattern combination, 
we need to know the occurrence probabilities of the two patterns. 
They can be derived from the ten possible patterns combinations 
corresponding to the ten hidden digits: 1) none; 2) ►; 3) ►►; 4) 
►►►; 5) ►►►►; 6) ▼; 7) ▼►; 8) ▼►►; 9) ▼►►►; 10) 
▼►►►►. Assuming the hidden digit distributes uniformly over 
{0,…,9}, each of the above ten pattern combinations appears in 
one response with probability 0.1. This means that the occurrence 
probability of ▼ and ►►►► will be 0.5 and 0.2, respectively. 
Given n responses, the probabilities that ▼ and ►►►► appear 
at least once are 1 (1 0.5) 1 0.5n n     and 
1 (1 0.2) 1 0.8n n    , respectively. Further assuming that the 
two patterns can appear independently in the n responses, the 
occurrence probability of the pattern combination ▼+►►►► 
becomes   1 0.5 1 0.8n n  . 
When the PIN digit is 4, 5 or 9, following a similar process to the 
above one, we can derive that the occurrence probability of the 
pattern combination of interest is also   1 0.5 1 0.8n n  . 
When the PIN digit is 2, the ten pattern combinations 
corresponding to the ten hidden digits are: 1) none; 2) ►; 3) ►►; 
4) ◄; 5) ◄; 6) ▼; 7) ▼►; 8) ▼►►; 9) ▼◄; 10) ▼◄◄. 
Thus, the occurrence probabilities of the patterns ▼, ►► and 
◄◄ are 0.5, 0.2 and 0.2, respectively. Given n responses, ▼ 
appears at least once with probability 1 (1 0.5) 1 0.5n n    . The 
probability that both ►► and ◄◄ appear at least once is a bit 
more complicated. Let us consider its complement event: ►► 
does not appear and ◄◄ does not appear. The probability of this 
complement event can be calculated as: 
(1 0.2) (1 0.2) (1 0.2 0.2) 2 0.8 0.6n n n n n         , 
where (1 0.2 0.2)n   is the probability that neither ►► nor ◄◄ 
appears (which has to be subtracted because it is counted twice in 
the other two terms of the probability). Now we can immediately 
derive the probability that both ►► and ◄◄ appear at least 
once:  1 2 0.8 0.6 1 0.6 2 0.8n n n n       . Then, combining 
the probabilities of ▼ , ►► and ◄◄, the final occurrence 
probability of the pattern combination ▼+►►+◄◄ is 
  1 0.5 1 0.6 2 0.8n n n    . 
When the PIN digit is 1, 3, 6, 7 or 8, following a similar process to 
the above one, we can derive that probability of the pattern 
combination of interest is also   1 0.5 1 0.6 2 0.8n n n    . 
